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STRANGERS, THE STATE AND THE SELF IN GERMANY:
A COMPARATIVE VIEW*
JOS D. M. PLATENKAMP 
1. Introduction
When, in 2010, the German chancellor Angela Merkel dismissed the “multicultural approach” 
as an “absolute failure”,1 and the Bavarian minister-president Horst Seehofer insisted that the 
“integration” of immigrants could only be achieved if they complied with “our German Leitkultur”2 
they both reiterated the essentialist rei cations of a ‘national identity’ characterising the public 
and political discourses of many European nation-states. There indeed appears to be a growing 
consensus that the representatives of ‘other cultures’ living in Europe not only should conform to 
the laws of the State but also subscribe – at least in the public sphere – to those representations that 
identify the society in question as a “community of values”. The culturally speci c actions and 
values of immigrants might be tolerated in the private domain, provided they do not con ict with 
the values of the nation-state in question.3  
    A similar consensus seems to prevail at the level of the European Union. The Preamble of the 
Treaty on European Union of 2008 propagated the idea that its member States share a “common 
destiny”, originating in the “cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe“, and therefore 
constitute a common “community of values”4 as well. These orientations are evidently grounded in 
European paradigms of world history and philosophy. They draw on ideas deriving inter alia from 
Enlightenment, Christian morality and political secularism that are assigned a universal relevance. 
They inform many of the international legal and political discourses and their global advocacy is 
deemed a solemn task. 
    And yet, it is part of the same value con gurations to advocate the incorporation of ‘strange’ 
non-European representations into the personal repertoire of each individual citizen. Originating 
in Renaissance and Romanticist thought, and transmitted through ‘classical’ education, the idea 
pertains that the ‘oriental’ other may be valued as a source of metaphysical wisdom, moral purity, 
artistic originality and proximity to Nature. 
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* The present contribution is based on a paper presented by the author in the framework of the Interna-
tional Guest Lecture Series at the Institute for Social Anthropology of the Austrian Academy of Sci-
ences, Vienna, March 27 2014.  
1 Süddeutsche Zeitung 16.10.2010. 
2 „Integration heißt nicht nebeneinander, sondern miteinander leben auf dem gemeinsamen Fundament 
der Werteordnung unseres Grundgesetzes und unserer deutschen Leitkultur, die von den christlich-
jüdischen Wurzeln und von Christentum, Humanismus und Aufklärung geprägt ist“ (Horst Seehofer, 
ibid.); cf. note 4. 
3 Compare the answer, once given by a Dutch Cabinet Minister to the question why the Netherlands 
is the only State in Europe to uphold the categorical distinction between ‘autochthonous’ and ‘non-
indigenous’ (allochthoon) citizens to classify the descendants of immigrants: “How does one get rid 
of this [distinction between] autochthoon and allochthoon? At one point one is Dutch [...] when one 
has obtained a place in Dutch society, when one participates in it, subscribes to our values and norms 
[...] what one does behind one’s front door is one’s own business” (Anil Ramdas, www.nrc.nl/ramdas/
artikel/1103538384826.html; my translation and italics)..
4 As such are identi ed the “universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, 
freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law” (Preamble of the Treaty on European Union, O  cial 
Journal C 115 , 09/05/2008).
    A peculiar con guration thus appears to characterise the valuation of people, ideas and actions 
of ‘strange’ provenance. What is excluded at the level of the nation-state should be included at the 
level of the individual’s life experience. As far as this valuation of ‘strangers’ is concerned a curious 
gap opens up between the nation-state and the individual Self.
To examine such value con gurations let us recall Salman Rushdie’s words that “the only one who 
sees the whole picture […] is the one who steps out of the frame”.5 A “view from afar”6 is needed, 
and social anthropology is the social science par excellence to provide such a perspective. For only 
when observed through the lenses of other societies may one perceive the cultural idiosyncrasy of 
our own ideas and values more sharply. So let me therefore turn to some Southeast Asian societies 
 rst, and see how they value the presence of ‘strangers’ in their midst.
2. The di erential origins of the person in Southeast Asia
In contrast to the cultural homogeneity proclaimed by the European nation-state and the European 
Union many Southeast Asian societies of old apply heterogeneous models in conceptualising their 
identity. These models are built from relations between opposed categories of a cosmological, 
social, political and ontological nature. These manifest themselves both at the level of the individual 
person and at the level of society at large. Without going into details let me sketch some of these 
dimensions. 
In many regions of the world mythical narratives have been recorded that address the question under 
what conditions a person may be considered complete. Known as myths about the ‘half-person’ or 
‘unilateral  gure’7 they relate how a  rst human being is born with a remarkable de ciency. In 
Rodney Needham’s words: “The  gure is generally a man or, as a mythical creature, has the form 
of a man; occasionally it can be a woman or some other entity such as a spirit in quasi-human form. 
What has to be imagined is the lateral half of a symmetrical body parted longitudinally. Normally, 
in order to move, it hops on its solitary leg”.8 In Southeast Asia such myths were collected among 
the Iban of Borneo,9 the Loloda of the North Moluccas10 and Roti in Southeast Indonesia,11 among 
others. The myths do not assess the person’s de ciency in physiological terms but attribute it to 
the absence of certain primordial socio-cosmological relationships. They describe how these 
relationships come into being one after another, and only after this process has been accomplished 
will the protagonist have become complete. Of course, the types of relationships involved vary 
considerably from one society to another – after all, they constitute a kind of blueprint of the social 
order in itself.12 Nevertheless the myths share a basic theme (a mythème to speak with Lévi-Strauss) 
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5 S. Rushdie, The ground beneath her feet. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1999.
6 C. Lévi-Strauss, Le regard éloigné. Paris: Plon, 1983. 
7  E.g. A. Szabo, “Der halbe Mensch und der biblische Sündenfall”, Paideuma 2: 96–100, 1941; A. E. 
Jensen, “Die mythische Vorstellung vom halben Menschen”, Paideuma 5: 23–43, 1950.
8 R. Needham, “Unilateral Figures”, in: R. Needham, Reconnaissances. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 
pp. 17–40, 1980, p. 20.
9 C. Sather, “The One-Sided One: Iban Rice Myths, Agricultural Ritual and Notions of Ancestry”, in: 
A. R. Walker (ed.), Rice in Southeast Asian Myth and Ritual. Special Issue Contributions to Southeast 
Asian Ethnography 10: 119–50, 1994.
10 M. J. van Baarda, “Het Loda’sch in vergelijking met het Galela’sch dialect op Halmaheira, gevolgd 
door Loda’sche teksten”, Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 56: 317–496, 1904. 
11 J. J. Fox, n.d., The Origin of the Dog. Unpublished typescript.
12 J. D. M. Platenkamp, “Des personnes incomplètes aux sociétés accomplies”, l’Homme 174: 125–60, 2005.
in common. The initial de ciency of the protagonist does not a ect the living condition of his body 
as such – that body does grow and ‘hop around’. The incompleteness manifests itself in the person’s 
appearance as perceived by others. I shall return to this point presently. 
As said, the social and cosmological relationships that grant the  rst human beings their completeness 
are highly diverse, but in these and other myths about the genesis of primeval ancestors certain 
types recur time and again. Two types of origins and the di erent social dimensions emanating 
from them are distinguished. An autochthonous origin is ascribed to the ‘living’ condition of the 
human body and of domesticated plants and animals. The  rst human beings may have born from 
indigenous plant species such as rice plants,13 pumpkins14 or root crops15 or have emerged directly 
from the local soil.16 Such a ‘living‘ condition of humans is not perceived in physical terms nor is 
that of the soil understood in ecological terms. The condition results from the incorporation of a 
‘life-giving’ component from sources over which indigenous spirits wield authority. Withdrawn 
from the land to be embodied in primeval humans, and in the children born ever since, such ‘life-
giving’ components will eventually return to these indigenous sources at death – a process requiring 
the performance of primary mortuary rituals. And once the society in question has been fully 
established, it is mostly a person’s maternal relatives and their ancestors who mediate the transfer 
of ‘life’ from such indigenous sources at birth and its eventual return there at death. Whatever the 
speci c categories of kin and the ritual tasks imposed upon them, in reference to this ‘life-giving’ 
dimension each person is of autochthonous provenance.
The mere embodiment of this ‘life-giving’ principle, however, does not generate complete human 
beings. The general idea pertains that, if the incorporation of ‘life’ is to grant humans their lifetime, 
this embodiment must be socially authorised. A social condition must be superimposed on the 
conjunction between body and life – an imperative that assumes di erent forms throughout the 
region. In many societies this social condition is conceptualised as an additional component of the 
person. Signifying a dimension of human existence that di ers radically from that of the body’s 
‘living’ condition I have labelled such component parts as a person’s ‘image’ or ‘Gestalt’.17 It may 
be deemed present in the liver, the blood or the heart, but it is indexed above all by the person’s 
visible appearance as projected, for instance, in the shadow that he casts (hence such conventional 
renderings of these concepts as ‘shadow soul’, ‘alter ego’ etcetera). 
The mere fact that a person’s ‘image’ is visible to the outside world points towards an important 
idea. It is the acknowledgement by others that gives a person’s ‘image’ its true social value. For 
neither can such a social acknowledgement stem from the person’s subjective perception of the 
self, nor should it depend on these other persons’ subjective assessment of that person’s ‘image’. It 
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13 E.g. in Java and Bali: M. Appel, Dewi Sri und die Kinder des Putut Jantaka: Beziehungen zwischen 
Mensch und Reis in Mythologie und Brauchtum auf Java und Bali. München: Anacon-Verlag, 1991.
14 E.g. Rmeet of North Laos: G. Sprenger, Die Männer, die den Geldbaum fällten: Konzepte von Aus-
tausch und Gesellschaft bei den Rmeet von Takheung. Laos, Berlin: LitVerlag, 2006.
15 E.g. Laboya of Sumba: D. C. Geirnaert-Martin, The woven land of Laboya. Socio-cosmic ideas and val-
ues on West Sumba, Eastern Indonesia. Leiden: CNWS, 1992.
16 E.g. Marobo of East Timor, B. Renard-Clamagirand, Marobo: une société ema de Timor. Paris: Selaf, 
1982.
17 J. D. M. Platenkamp, “Visibility and Objecti cation in Tobelo Ritual”, in: P. Crawford & M. Postma 
(eds.), Re ecting Visual Ethnography – using the camera in anthropological  eldwork, pp. 78–102. 
Aarhus: Intervention Press & Leiden: CNWS Press, 2006.
can only be generated by strictly regulated ritual actions.18 All this points towards the idea, that the 
individual’s subjective awareness of the self, of his consciousness, emotions, and moral judgements 
must be  rmly subordinated to such a ritually constructed social ‘image’. 
To ful l this task the transfer of objects is indispensible. An example from the Lao of Laos may 
clarify this. A newborn child consists of a body animated by the life-giving component called 
khuan. All khuan derives from autochthonous spiritual origins called “Old Father Past Mother” 
(pò kao mae: lang). The  rst movements of the foetus experienced by the mother-to-be signal 
that this khuan has begun to animate the body. During the  rst month of existence a newborn 
child has no social identity. On the contrary, still being exclusively connected to the autochthonous 
spiritual origin of its ‘life’, the child has neither a socially acknowledged gender nor a personal 
name, but is designated as a “spirit child” (luk phi:) instead. In the sense discussed earlier the child 
is ‘incomplete’. To provide this “spirit child” with its social image as a Lao person, one month after 
birth a ritual is performed, in which matrilateral relatives transfer gift objects to it. Each of these 
objects communicates that social image in a speci c value dimension. Embodied in the coins, 
jewellery, pencils or notebooks given to the infant are those social qualities (such as prosperity, 
marriage bliss, progeny and intelligence) that identify each giver who bestows these qualities onto 
the child – an idea expressed in utterances such as “I have only one earring to give to you – may 
you become like me”. Such qualities in their totality constitute the social image that Lao society 
values highest.19 
The Lao thus con rm Marcel Mauss’ seminal observations that gift objects embody component 
parts of the givers, that in their transfer these parts are passed on to others, and that in the process 
the distinction between object and subject becomes blurred.20 In other Southeast Asian societies 
similar ideas are manifest in the weapons, jewellery, porcelain or ivory objects, or coinage that are 
transferred in various ritual contexts. Time and again we  nd that only by transferring such objects 
the ‘images’ of the persons involved can be assigned a social, that is, a trans-subjective value. Such 
transfers express the idea that in order to socialise an individual person’s ‘image’, that image must 
literally be objecti ed. Let me take a closer look at this phenomenon.
The ‘life’ that animates the bodies of humans is subject to the cycle of life and death. It is incorporated 
in the person during pregnancy or birth, whereas his death and the decomposition of his corpse 
lead to the return of this ‘life’ to its cosmological origins in the land. The objects transferred, 
however, are made from materials that resist decay. This stands to reason, for whereas at death 
human ‘life’ is alienated from the social community, the deceased’s ‘image’ should be preserved, so 
as to grant the families their ancestral continuity and the society as a whole its permanence. Thus 
one observes that even in those cases in which the skeleton remains of the deceased are preserved 
to that end, in their bare form these remains are insu  cient to communicate the social value that 
adheres to the deceased’s image. That value can only be proclaimed if that ‘image’ is invested in 
enduring valuable objects and is re-integrated as such into the community of the living. Elaborate 
mortuary rituals, therefore, may entail the ‘objecti cation’ of human ‘image’ by its embodiment in 
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18 Cf. S. J. Tambiah, “A performative approach to ritual”, Proceedings of the British Academy 65 (1979): 
113—69; J. D. M. Platenkamp, op.cit.
19 J. D. M. Platenkamp‚ “Becoming a Lao person. Rituals of birth and socialisation in Luang Prabang, 
Laos”, in: P. Berger, R. Hardenberg, E. Kattner and M. Prager (eds.), The Anthropology of Values, Es-
says in Honour of Georg Pfe er, pp. 180–200. Delhi: Pearson Education, 2010.
20 Marcel Mauss, “Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l’échange dans les sociétés archaïques”, L’Année 
sociologique 1923/1924.
objects such as jewellery, rock pillars, bu alo tusks, or coinage that are preserved in houses, village 
shrines or community graveyards.
3. The di erential origins of society
In contrast to the autochthonous origin of ‘life’, the artefacts in which human ‘image’ can be 
objecti ed tend to be assigned an external, non-autochthonous provenance value. They may have 
“fallen from the skies” or have been brought from other islands or distant countries – domains that 
are foreign not only in the spatial but also in the cosmological sense. Along with the introduction of 
such imaged objects in the past, certain institutions that such objects signify make their appearance 
as well. With the emergence of these ‘foreign’ objects, laws, political o  ces, titles and standards of 
exchange – in short, a socio-political order – are introduced as well.
Numerous myths from continental and insular Southeast Asia speak of a foreign ruler making his 
appearance in the land in order to found such a socio-political order. To perform this task of roi 
civilisateur21 the immigrant ruler must relate to the autochthonous sources of ‘life’ – represented 
by the leaders of the indigenous communities and the local spirits wielding authority over these 
sources. It results in the establishment of diarachic orders, in which the authority is shared between 
the descendants of immigrants and those of indigenous ancestors.22 To the immigrants’ descendants 
is assigned the task of communicating and exchanging with the outside world; they represent the 
foreign origins of valuable objects and the prestige and military prowess, which these signify. The 
descendants of indigenous ancestors, on the other hand, act as representatives of the autochthonous 
spirits in the land.
    The connection between such contrasting origins, and the categories of people and objects 
‘descending’ from them,  rst established in mythical time, must be reproduced time and again 
by means of ritual actions. In rituals of marriage and birth, healing or death objects and persons 
of indigenous origin (such as vegetable foodstu s, locally produced artefacts, and marriageable 
women) must be exchanged against objects and persons to whom a foreign origin is ascribed (such 
as weapons, money and other durable valuables, and marriageable men). This does not mean that 
every groom himself should be, or descend from, an immigrant, but that he, his ancestors and the 
gifts he transfers are valued for originating abroad. 
It is such conjunctions between foreign and indigenous categories of objects and persons23 – 
conjunctions e ectuated in the ritual exchanges – that generate completeness both at the level of the 
person and at the level of society as a whole. For just as the complete person must be composed of 
a body the life of which ultimately originates in the local soil, and an image, objecti ed in enduring 
valuables of foreign origin, likewise a complete society can only come into being and be ritually 
reproduced if the access to the fertility of the land and the fecundity of its inhabitants is authorised 
by ancestors of foreign provenance. 
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21 J. D. M. Platenkamp, “Colonial encounters in the North Moluccas: Indigenous perspectives”, forth-
coming.
22 P. E. de Josselin de Jong, ‘Ruler and realm: Political myths in western Indonesia’, Mededelingen der 
Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, vol. 43, pp. 
1–19, 1980; R. Jordaan & P. E. de Josselin de Jong, ‚Sickness as a metaphor in Indonesian political 
myths’, Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 141: 253–74, 1983. 
23 Such imperatives to mutually transfer persons and things of contrasting origins re ect a logic of non-
equivalence exchange that contradicts both Mauss’ and Lévi-Strauss’ assumptions that ‘reciprocity’ be 
grounded in the equivalence logic of ‘like-for-like’.
This, then, is the core ideological message: If either the person or the society would be of 
autochthonous origin exclusively it would deprive either of them of their very sociality. And yet, it 
is this idea that appears to inform the valuation of ‘strangers’ in German society. 
4. ‘Strangers’ in Germany
The current presence of most ‘strangers’ in Germany results from three distinct processes of 
immigration during the last 150 years.24 In each of these processes particular types of ideological 
equivalences are manifest.
The  rst process is that of inviting members of other societies – from Polish steelworkers and miners 
in the 19th century to Mediterranean and Turkish ‘guest labourers’ (Gastarbeiter) in the wake of the 
Wirtschaftswunder in the 1950s and 1960s – to contribute to the economic production of the Federal 
Republic of Germany.25 Their contribution should  ll the gaps in the national production process, 
but in doing so the ‘guest labourers’ should not express their particular identity as ‘strangers’. On 
the contrary, the latter identity (expressed for instance in language or religious practice) would 
rather be considered as an impediment to their labour productivity. Their worth for German society 
at large could only be measured quantitatively in reference to their contribution to the national 
economy. Hence it was valued in a manner fundamentally di erent from the contribution of the 
category of the ‘stranger’ in complementing qualitatively the socio-cosmological order in the 
Southeast Asian societies. As ‘guest labourers’ they should not be di erent from German labourers 
in any other respect than in that of their economic contribution. In other words, the ‘strangers’ were 
valued for being economically equivalent to the German labourers.
In the German Democratic Republic (GDR) the assessment of this category of ‘strangers’ was 
assigned an additional, political dimension. From the 1960s onwards, so-called ‘contractual 
labourers’ (Vertragsarbeiter) were recruited in Poland (1965), Hungary (1967), Mozambique (1979) 
and North Vietnam (1980) – states that shared with the GDR the same socialist ideology. Hence, 
whereas in the Federal Republic the ‘guest labourers’ were individually rewarded with wages, the 
contribution of ‘contractual labourers’ to the economic productivity of the GDR was additionally 
informed by an ideology of exchange between states. For once the ‘contractual labourers’ had 
returned home they would be able to apply the skills acquired to the bene t of the economic 
development of their home countries. In this case the exchange was de ned in economic terms 
as well, be it that the exchange partners were declared equivalent both in economic and political 
terms. In the case of the GDR, ‘strangers’ were assigned a politico-economic equivalence.
    These evaluations in economic terms subscribe to the standard axioms of monetary market 
economics, stipulating that monetised exchange transactions should not express any ‘economically 
irrelevant’ characteristics of the exchange partners. In both cases, the ‘strangeness’ of ‘guest-’ or 
‘contractual labourers’ was exteriorised by transforming that into the equivalence between ‘own 
people’ and ‘strangers’ conceptualised in economic terms. As Louis Dumont has argued, modern 
political economy and homo aequalis walk hand in hand.26
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24 Cf. J. D. M. Platenkamp, “Über die gesellschaftliche Relevanz der Ethnologie”, in: U. Bertels u.a. (Hrsg.), 
Aus der Ferne in die Nähe. Neue Wege der Ethnologie in die Ö entlichkeit, pp. 21–32. Münster, 2004.
25 At present there live some 2,6 million people of Turkish descent in Germany, a classi cation masking 
a considerable socio-cultural and religious heterogeneity; L. Prager, Die ‚Gemeinschaft des Hauses’: 
Religion, Heiratsstrategien und transnationale Identität türkischer Alawi/Nusairi-Migranten in Deut-
schland. Berlin, Münster: LIT Verlag, 2010.
26 L. Dumont, Homo Aequalis. Genèse et epanouissement de l’idéologie économique. Paris 1977.
    A second wave of immigration in Germany is based on an altogether di erent set of values. It 
concerns people of “German descent” (deutscher Abstammung), who had emigrated a long time 
ago but are considered to still share an identity with those who stayed behind. This identity (legally 
conceptualised in terms of ius sanguinis, literally, “rights by blood”) entitles them to ‘return’ to 
Germany as “emigrants” respectively “delayed emigrants” (Aussiedler or Spätaussiedler).27 The 
valuation of this category of ‘strangers’ in German society is clearly di erent from that of the 
‘guest labourers’ in West Germany and ‘contractual labourers’ in East Germany. It stipulates that 
people who share the same cultural identity – conceptualised as a common descent from ‘German 
origins’ – are entitled to live in the same national territory and to an immediate acquisition of state 
citizenship. The fact that in the former Soviet Union and other eastern European countries they 
were stigmatised for being culturally di erent – more precisely, for being ‘Germans’ in the wake 
of the Second World War – morally obliged the German state to invite them to ‘return home’, so to 
speak. 
    Aussiedler are not expected to  ll the gaps in the national economic production process but to 
overcome a moral dilemma, created by the dissociation between a shared cultural identity, on the 
one side, and membership of di erent nation-states, on the other. Relevant to our discussion is 
the fact that the Aussiedler in Germany do not represent a category of people, who are valued for 
complementing German society as ‘strangers’. On the contrary, in spite of de facto being cultural 
‘strangers’ in German society, they are valued for not being so. In other words, their ‘strangeness’ 
is being exteriorised by transforming that into a cultural equivalence.
The third process that has resulted in the presence of ‘strangers’ in Germany re ects yet another 
type of values. It is based on the principle, laid down in the Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of 1949, stipulating that people subject to state prosecution in their home country are entitled to be 
granted political asylum in Germany.28 In 2012, about 110,000 new asylum claims were submitted 
in Germany – the largest number among the world’s industrialised states29 – and Germany granted 
more claims than any other EU member state (i.e. 17.140, against 12.400 in Sweden, 8.655 in France 
and 7.735 in the United Kingdom).30 One should expect this policy to be a source of collective 
pride to the German society at large but it seems to be valued rather as the partial redemption of a 
collective guilt incurred by the atrocities of the so-called ‘Third Reich’. 
    The value to which this praxis testi es is  rmly grounded in the idea of the inviolability of 
individual human rights. As a universally applicable principle it was codi ed into international 
law when the United Nations member states adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
in 1948, and it was inscribed in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany of 1949 and 
in the Preamble of the Treaty on European Union of 2008. It is this proclaimed universality that is 
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27 As Aussiedler are de ned the almost 3 million “Germans and their relatives” (Deutsche und ihre An-
gehörigen) who entered Germany between 1950 and 1992; about half of them came from Poland. The 
circa 1,3 million Spätaussiedler, who came above all from the former Soviet Union, entered Germany 
between 1993 and 2000.
28 Thus Article 16a of the Constitution stipulates that “victims of political prosecution are entitled to the 
right of asylum” ([...] politisch Verfolgte genießen Asylrecht [...]). The Article declares this right applicable 
to the citizens of those states in which the “protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms” (“[...] 
Schutz der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten [...]” (Abs. 2) is not guaranteed and in which citizens 
are exposed to “[...] political persecution [or] inhuman or humiliating punishment or treatment [...]” (...
politische Verfolgung [oder] unmenschliche oder erniedrigende Bestrafung oder Behandlung [...]”(Abs. 3).
29 http://www.unhcr.org/532afe986.html, 19.3.2014.
30 Eurostat 22.3.2013; http://www.proasyl.de/de/themen/zahlen-und-fakten/asyl-in-europa/). 
legally de ned as being applicable to German and foreign people alike. The latter must be shielded 
by the same fundamental rights that also protect German citizens. It is not as representative of 
Bosnian, Algerian, or Somalian culture that one is granted asylum, but as an individual person 
whose universal human rights de ne one as subject to the same fundamental human rights as a 
German person. In such contexts, their ‘strangeness’ is subordinated to a legally de ned equivalence.
5. The German self
At the level of the German nation-state, the ‘strange’ identity of immigrants tends to be negated by 
declaring them equivalent in economic, cultural or legal terms. In other, non-economic and non-
political contexts of social life, however, aesthetic, religious or intellectual expressions of ‘strange’ 
cultural traditions are incorporated without being subjected to such negating tendencies. On the 
contrary, such expressions not only preserve their ‘strange’ identity, they are also positively valued 
as enriching contributions to the development of the individual person. 
    Elaborating on the 19th century bourgeois ideal of Bildung the German person may pursue a 
‘completion’ (Vervollkommnung)31 of the self by internalising the very expressions of ‘strange’. 
provenance that are declared irrelevant to the socio-cultural identity of the State and its institutions. 
In 1890, Kaiser Wilhelm II referred to the ensuing contradiction between the person’s internalisation 
of ‘strange’ cultural representations and their rejection at the level of the state, arguing that the 
‘classics’ taught at the Gymnasium should serve to “educate young national Germans, not young 
Greeks or Romans”.32 Concepts such as Leitkultur resonating in popular-political discourse suggest 
that little has changed since – be it that the ‘classical’ other nowadays is dressed in non-European 
garb. Hence one may enjoy Nigerian literature, Thai cuisine, Peruvian music, or Ayurveda healing 
and yet reject the idea, that immigrants are to be represented in parliament by their own political 
parties. And whereas Zen meditation may be celebrated as a source of metaphysical wisdom, Su  
mysticism becomes suspect when associated with Islamic precepts of a just socio-political order.
I assume such ideological con gurations to characterise mutatis mutandis the value systems of other 
European nation-states as well. In exteriorising at the level of the nation-state what is interiorised 
at the level of the self they all seem to apply the Enlightenment precept that state and church be 
separated and religion be relegated to the domain of individual morality. It therefore should come 
as no surprise that this banishment of the religious and moral tenets of ‘strange’ cultural traditions 
from the political domain is contested by some of their representatives. These may challenge the 
“European secularists’ [...] identity protection”, arguing, that “[the] mass immigration of Muslims is 
bringing faith back into the public realm and creating a post-Enlightenment modernity for Western 
Europe. This return of religion threatens secular humanism, the orthodoxy that has prevailed since 
the French Revolution”.33
5. Conclusion
In the context of political, social, religious and media discourses on the nation-state and the 
European Union, one assumes a concordance between a homogeneous ‘national’ political identity 
and an equally homogeneous socio-cultural identity. Such assumptions entail an exteriorising 
de nition of ‘the stranger’ as ‘the foreigner’, precluding the latter from being perceived and valued 
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32 Cited in Kaube, op.cit., p. 30; my translation.
33 Irshad Manji, quoted in: Democracy Digest, Vol. 1(2), November 2004.
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as a constitutive part of the ‘own’ society as a whole. In other – non-political – contexts of social 
life, artistic, religious or intellectual expressions of ‘strange’ cultural traditions are internalised, to 
be valued as enriching experiences, ‘completing’ the personal lives of the society’s members, even 
if these contributions are irrelevant to the socio-cultural identity of the state and its institutions.
In view of the mere presence of millions of citizens of foreign origin in west European states 
interacting daily with other citizens in various social contexts, the exteriorising de nitions of the 
‘stranger’ create fundamental problems. They deprive citizens of di erent origins of the means 
to conceive of their own cultural identity as a valuable contribution in itself to the society of 
which they have become part. The real and potential results are political indi erence and social 
alienation. It therefore is an urgent question whether such exteriorising discourses are an inevitable 
corollary of any construction of socio-political identity and a necessary condition for the e ective 
functioning of multicultural nation-states. The examples from Southeast Asia show that alternative 
modes of identity construction are in evidence in other, non-European societies. It may be socially 
and politically advantageous to take this fact properly into account.
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